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Lessons from Enron——–
And Why We Don’t Learn from Them
By Nancy B. Rapoport
By speaking up, you might help to avoid future Enrons.
Recently, a cab driver said something that really caught my attention: “Remember when we thought that Enron was so bad? Those were 
the good old days.” 
He was right.
We were all shocked by Enron (and WorldCom, 
and Tyco, and Global Crossing, and Parmalat, and 
so on) because it never occurred to us that companies 
could lie to us for so long. We assumed that audits 
could catch lies, or that free markets could catch lies, 
or (at the very least) that employees would catch lies. 
We were wrong.
In 2004, Bala G. Dharan and I studied Enron in an 
attempt to learn from it so that we would be able to 
prepare people to prevent future Enrons.1 We wrote 
roughly the 84th book on Enron; even more books 
on the subject have appeared since then. Our fi rst 
edition discussed the history of scandals before En-
ron, what went into the Enron fraud, and what we 
might be able to do differently in the future. And 
guess what? We now have the scandals resulting 
from subprime loans, derivatives, Ponzi schemes 
involving Bernie Madoff, Ramalinga Raju of Satyam 
Computer Services and Texas billionaire Allen Stan-
ford, and the mismanagement of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac. Our fi rst edition didn’t do anything 
to stop future Enrons.
Looking back, I’m not surprised. Our book looked at 
structural problems without examining how human 
nature might affect even the best of structures. So our 
second edition spends a lot more time on how humans 
(even the brightest of them) make stupid mistakes. We 
don’t expect to stop future Enrons any more. But it is 
important to point out why we can’t stop them and 
what you might learn from recent economic history. 
Here are the lessons that I’ve learned from Enron and 
later incidents of fi nancial mismanagement:
Structures, by themselves, do nothing to stop 
people from making dumb mistakes.
Never base your structures on the presumption 
that people are good (even if you believe that 
they are).
Don’t trust; verify.
If it sounds wrong to you, it may well be wrong. 
Someone has to slow down decisions by speak-
ing up, and you are that someone.
Structures, by Themselves, 
Do Nothing to Stop People 
from Making Dumb Mistakes
Enron had tons of structures in place to prevent 
fraud. Unfortunately, it didn’t follow them.
Take the Enron ethics code, a copy of which I 
picked up from eBay. The cornerstone of Enron’s 
ethics code was a four-part mnemonic: RICE,2
which stood for respect, integrity, communica-
tion and excellence. Anyone who ever negotiated 
with Enron knows that Enron was exceptionally 
aggressive, didn’t follow through on many of its 
promises, made deals that looked real but were 
actually not what they seemed, and made big, fl at-
out-dumb deals. So much for following Enron’s 
own ethics rules. 
What about Chief Financial Offi cer Andrew Fas-
tow’s self-dealing with LJM and LJM2, the structures 
that took certain Enron assets off Enron’s balance 
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sheets at a profi t of more than $40 million to Fastow? 
Enron’s board approved Fastow’s self-dealing (more 
than once), with the proviso that there would be 
structures that protected Enron. No one, however, 
paid any attention to whether or not Enron (or LJM) 
used those structures. 
Here’s another example: In exploring how the 
banks may have colluded with Enron, the Enron 
examiner found the following: 
Not only was Citigroup sophisticated in struc-
tured finance, it understood that structured 
fi nance could be misused. At the time many 
of these [Enron] transactions were being com-
pleted, Citigroup’s Global Capital Structuring 
group applied an “appropriateness test” to help 
determine whether the bank should engage in 
a particular transaction. Transaction Execution 
packages were required to include a written 
questionnaire that set out ten areas of review. 
These questions went beyond the objective 
fi nancial criteria such as the client’s credit risk 
and focused on the more subjective measures of 
the transaction.
The ten areas, which had to be addressed and ap-
proved by the “Designated Responsible Senior” 
for each transaction, were as follows:
1. Lack of transparency (Business Objective)—
The true economic substance of the transaction 
cannot be determined from the structure without 
signifi cant analysis.
2. Secrecy of identity of true party—The true 
identity of a party to the transaction cannot be 
determined because of the use of SPV’s [sic] or 
charitable trusts in offshore tax havens or bank 
secrecy jurisdictions.
3. Circularity—The transaction is essentially cir-
cular with the customer being both the ultimate 
lender and borrower and/or ultimate buyer 
and seller.
4. Fragmentation—The transaction is structured so 
that no one document describes the whole trans-
action, making it possible for a reader to review 
documents for a segment of the transaction and not 
understand that it is part of a larger transaction.
5. Unusual terms—The transaction is off-market 
or contains terms which are signifi cantly differ-
ent from what one would expect.
6. Absence of rules/guidance—The applicable 
regulatory/legal/accounting/tax systems lack de-
veloped rules or guidance for complex products.
7. Event risk in regulatory/legal/accounting 
systems—The rules governing the transac-
tion are not predictable and could be subject 
to sudden application of tighter standards, or 
heightened prosecution because of political or 
social developments.
8. Multiple jurisdictions—Multiple jurisdictions 
are involved with internal approvals sought 
individually in each making the process harder 
to manage and the risk of oversight of the entire 
transaction greater.
9. Lack of confi rmation of customer assurances—
The absence of third party confi rmations (e.g., 
regulators, auditors, appraisers) of customer 
assurances on sensitive issues.
10. Disproportionate impact—The transaction 
will have a signifi cant impact on the customer’s 
fi nancial condition or results, and will not be 
required to be disclosed.3
Now, that’s a pretty sensible list. You probably 
have a list like that, or similar guidelines, in your 
own organization. The problem with this list is that 
even though several of Enron’s transactions with 
Citigroup triggered more than one (heck, more than 
fi ve) of the warning signs on this list, Citigroup went 
through with the transaction anyway. Lesson? The 
structure was fi ne. But no one at Citigroup used it to 
avoid transactions that failed the “smell test.” 
Never Base Your Structures on 
the Presumption That People 
Are Good (Even if You Believe 
That They Are)
Regulations are great at giving people guidelines 
about what to do when they want to comply with 
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the rules, but they’re awful at guiding people who 
want to get around the rules. These folks don’t be-
lieve that they’re going to get caught, or they just 
like living near (over?) the edge. You need to build 
structures that make it diffi cult for people to cheat, 
even if you can’t envision your colleagues being 
cheats or liars. I’ve read far too many stories of 
people who, for example, used the same person to 
open the mail, deposit the checks and balance the 
books—only to fi nd out that that very nice person 
was embezzling thousands of dollars while looking 
just as sweet as pie. If you ever fi nd yourself in the 
position of drafting structures at your company—
the rules and regulations that will govern your 
department—don’t make the mistake of assuming 
that because you’re nice and honest, everyone else 
will be, too.
Don’t Trust; Verify
In one of my favorite cases, the well-known law 
fi rm Kaye, Scholer was sanctioned for trusting its 
client to tell the truth, even though the client had 
been caught in a big lie before. (Among the cli-
ent’s4 other foibles, the principals of the company 
forged computer leases—for computers that never 
existed—by lying upside down underneath a glass 
coffee table and tracing necessary signatures. Talk 
about contorting the fi nancials!) There’s nothing 
wrong with assuming that most things that some-
one is telling you are true, but double-check every 
once in a while to reassure yourself. (NINJA5 loans 
come to mind, perhaps?) And, for goodness’ sake, 
if someone has lied to you—again, think Enron—
don’t continue to deal with that person without 
verifying every possible statement that that now-
proven liar makes.6
If It Sounds Wrong to You, 
It May Well Be Wrong
Sherron Watkins’s famous memos to Ken Lay—
the anonymous fi rst memo and the second one, 
which she signed—warned Lay that Enron might 
“implode in a wave of accounting scandals”7 after 
Jeff Skilling, the company’s former CEO, suddenly 
resigned. Watkins had suspected that several of the 
company’s recent deals were fi shy, and she urged 
Lay to “fess up and fi x the problems.” Watkins is 
an accountant, and she was far from alone in being 
one of the many intelligent employees at Enron. 
Not everybody knew about the shaky deals, but 
enough people did. (How hard is it to realize that 
Merrill Lynch wasn’t buying three Nigerian barges 
from Enron, near the end of a fi scal quarter, not 
to own those barges but to take them off Enron’s 
books for a while?) 
My guess is that a lot of people at Enron just as-
sumed that they were “missing something” when 
they saw fi shy-looking deals. They assumed that 
their bosses knew something that they themselves 
didn’t and that—if they knew the whole story—
then they’d understand that the fishy-looking 
deals were really fi ne. In fact, the fi shy-looking 
deals were fi shy. They were real stinkers. But the 
way that humans tend to think caused these very 
bright folks to talk themselves out of questioning 
those deals.
People commonly make a number of these cogni-
tive errors. We humans are subject to peer pressure. 
We’re subject to assuming that someone else will 
take care of the problems, so that we don’t have to do 
anything ourselves when we see something wrong. 
We talk ourselves into believing that something that 
we know is wrong is justifi ed. 
Stanley Milgram did a study in the 1960s—
replicated just in the past 12 months—in which 
he invited an experimental subject and an actor 
(playing an experimental subject) into a very 
scientifi c-looking experiment on memorization. 
The actor randomly “drew” the role of “student,” 
leaving the real experimental subject to play the 
role of “teacher.” Every time the student missed a 
memorized word pair, the teacher was supposed to 
give him an electric shock. The fancy machine that 
Milgram hooked up to the student was fake, but it 
looked pretty real, and the shocks were supposed to 
increase by 15 volts each time the student missed a 
word pair. The machine let the teacher “shock” the 
student all the way up to 450 volts. Had the machine 
been real, such a high voltage would have killed the 
student. In fact, the student was just acting when 
he screamed, behind a screen, that the teacher was 
causing him intense pain.
Milgram found out that more than 60 percent 
of the subjects were willing to shock the students 
all the way to 450 volts—in essence, that more 
than 60 percent of subjects were willing to kill 
someone that they’d just met. Why? Milgram’s 
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theory was that, in order for someone to stop the 
experiment, he would have to admit to himself 
that what he’d been doing was wrong. To stop giv-
ing the shocks at, say, 90 volts, he’d have to admit 
that the 75-volt shock was wrong, too. Thanks to 
the theory of cognitive dissonance, people were 
unwilling to admit that they were “bad people” 
who would shock someone just because a guy in a 
white coat told them to do it. Because they didn’t 
want to think of themselves as bad, they’d justify 
to themselves that what they were doing was 
important or it was “out of their hands” because 
the experimenter was taking responsibility for the 
actor-subject’s “pain.”
Cognitive dissonance affects all of us. We all talk 
ourselves into doing dumb things, justifying what 
we’re doing to ourselves. We can’t actually stop being 
human, which means that we can’t avoid cognitive 
dissonance. We can, however, recognize that we’re 
privy to such cognitive mistakes. Being aware that 
you will make these mistakes keeps you just a little 
more sensitive to them, and being aware may also 
help you undo those mistakes after you make them. 
Someone Has to Slow Down 
Decisions by Speaking up, and 
You Are That Someone
Why did Enron fail? Why have the subprime lend-
ers failed? Why have all of these fancy new ideas to 
make money in the market failed? They all failed, 
in part, because people who did fi gure out that 
something wasn’t right didn’t speak up—or didn’t 
speak up to the right people. It’s easy to give into 
peer pressure. It’s unnerving to think about making 
a fuss over something, only to fi nd out that you were 
wrong and that the great majority of people were 
right. Most of us don’t want to take that risk. But 
someone has to be brave and speak up when he or 
she doesn’t understand how a deal works or why 
the lawyers and accountants have blessed something 
that just looks wrong. If those in, say, the rating 
agencies had disclosed the risks of these subprime 
tranches to the market, perhaps fewer people would 
have invested in them. (Who was the genius who 
decided that the mathematical models proved that 
people who couldn’t afford high mortgages in the 
fi rst place would somehow be able to pay off those 
mortgages over time?) If someone had just spoken 
up to say, “Should someone who makes $40,000 a 
year be buying a $750,000 house?” perhaps we could 
have slowed down the fi nancial juggernaut that has 
just run us over. Lesson: If you see something that 
you think might be wrong, speak up. Maybe you’re 
wrong. But just maybe you’re right, and, by speaking 
up, you might help to avoid future Enrons.
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